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Intra-Party Dynamics and the Political Transformation 
of Non-State Armed Groups
Véronique Dudouet, Berghof Foundation, Berlin, Germany
Although non-state armed groups are primary stakeholders in contemporary political conflicts, there has been little research into their members’ perspectives 
on internal factors shaping radicalisation and de-radicalisation. State and international actors often assume that bringing rebel leaders to the negotiating 
table or “converting” them to peaceful politicians means weakening, splitting, or dismantling militant structures. This paper re-evaluates those assumptions in 
the light of rebel leaders’ own accounts of internal organisational dynamics before, during, and after political conflicts and peace settlements. Participatory 
action research with “insider experts” from armed movements in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Nepal, Aceh, El Salvador, Colombia, and South Africa reveals in-
siders’ analysis of leadership and organisational dynamics during armed conflict and political talks and highlights the rational decision-making process 
whereby proactive leaders constantly (re)assess and adjust their tactics (from unarmed to armed and vice versa) as the strategic environment evolves. Hori-
zontal and vertical communication between members is critical for enabling collective ownership of transformation processes from violent insurgency to 
peaceful transition and preventing internal splits and disaffection during peace negotiations. The claim that rebel organisations should be dismantled as 
quickly as possible during peace processes is found to be dubious, highlighting instead the importance of retaining cohesive coordination and communication 
structures during volatile post-war transitions.
Although non-state armed groups represent primary stake-
holders in contemporary political conflicts, there is still 
little understanding among policy-makers or scholars of 
the internal drivers and dynamics which shape their rad-
icalisation and de-radicalisation processes. For instance, 
one often hears the assertion that bringing rebel leaders 
and so-called “spoilers” to the negotiation table or convert-
ing them into peaceful politicians requires weakening, 
splintering, or completely dismantling their militant struc-
tures. However, such claims are not supported by any em-
pirical evidence. This paper sets out to shed some light on 
armed group members’ own accounts of some of the fac-
tors shaping their transition from armed to non-violent 
politics.
According to existing research on armed insurgencies and 
conflict transformation, the various drivers of change 
which influence collective shifts from armed struggle to 
negotiated settlements can be classified along three levels 
of analysis: intra-group, group-state, and group-inter-
national community. This paper focuses on the first cat-
egory, assessing the internal dynamics that influence 
ideological, strategic and tactical shifts within armed or-
ganisations.
The findings stem from a participatory action research 
project, designed and carried out in collaboration 
with local analysts and members from former armed 
movements in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Nepal, Aceh, 
El Salvador, Colombia, and South Africa. Armed op-
position groups operating in these seven countries 
and territories over the past decades shared a number 
of important features that qualify them as “resistance 
or liberation movements” (listed in section 1). More-
over, they have all undergone successful transitions 
from violent insurgency to peaceful political par-
ticipation, through processes of negotiation, demobili-
sation, disarmament, and democratic 
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institutionalisation.1 In each country, a team com-
prised of local researchers and former group members 
was asked to reflect on the main factors which have 
shaped such transitions. This paper presents some of 
the outcomes of this research process, offering an in-
siders’ perspective on the shifts and relations in the 
ends and means of insurgency during (de-)radical-
isation (section 1), the intra-party factors (decision-
making and organisational dynamics) which influence 
their readiness to negotiate their transformation into 
peaceful political actors (section 2), and the impact of 
such transitions on their organisations (section 3).
1. Shifting Ends and Means: Political Vision and Strategies
The purpose of this first section is to clarify the ter-
minology used in this paper, defining the major features of 
the actors under scrutiny according to their self-ascribed 
goals and strategies (1.1.), and describing the applied 
understanding of (de)radicalisation, with a primary focus 
on shifts between violent and non-violent politics during 
extended peace processes (1.2.).
1.1. Resistance/Liberation Movements and Armed Struggle as Last Resort
Non-state armed groups are classically defined, in Webe-
rian fashion, as “violent challengers to the state’s monopoly 
of legitimate coercive force” (Policzer 2005, 8). Among the 
vast universe of such groups, the scope of enquiry of this 
paper is reduced to a sub-set of actors who pursue pri-
marily political (as opposed to economic or private) agen-
das; understand the use of force (often seen as a last resort) 
to be a legitimate and pragmatic tool of resistance against 
clearly defined opponents (i.e. as opposed to indis-
criminate terror); are formally organised and have hier-
archical, accountable structures (and often distinct military 
and political organs); and exercise some degree of territori-
al control (where they develop their own parallel govern-
ance structure). For the sake of clarity, one could also use 
the label “rebel opposition groups” (Holmqvist 2005, 45), 
conventionally defined as being “engaged in a political 
struggle … to redefine the political and legal basis of the 
society through the use of violence” (Bruderlein 2000, 8). 
Policzer’s aforementioned definition presents some serious 
shortcomings as it fails to capture the specific nature of 
these actors; by focusing solely on their temporary and 
adaptable means of action it overlooks their goals and 
ideology, as well as the unarmed components of their 
movements. In fact, such movements tend to see disrupting 
the state monopoly over the use of force as a temporary 
strategy, while their ultimate goal is precisely to restore 
monopoly to a legitimised (i.e. transformed or breakaway) 
state.
The term “non-state armed groups” is strongly rejected by 
the authors of a series of case studies written by, or in close 
collaboration with, members from seven former rebel 
movements (García Durán et al. 2008, Maharaj 2008, 
Ogura 2008, Aguswandi and Zunzer 2008, De Brún 2008, 
Bekaj 2010, Álvarez 2010).2 On the one hand, they argue 
that the label “non-state” neglects these movements’ as-
piration to statehood (through state capture, power-shar-
ing, or self-determination) as well as, at times, their 
quasi-governmental features as a state within a state. The 
label “armed groups”, for its part, fails to account for a 
complex set of means of political action, armed and un-
armed, which are evolving constantly according to circum-
stances and strategic calculations. In our research and 
capacity-building engagement with these actors, we thus 
decided to name them according to their own labels, which 
tend to reflect their primary objectives, and opted for the 
inclusive (and admittedly subjective) terminology of “resis-
tance/liberation movements”.
These actors do indeed primarily identify their struggles as 
political endeavours, rooted in a combination of identity-
based and/or class-based revolutionary ideology, represent-
ing the interests and grievances of an oppressed minority 
or a disempowered majority, and aiming to replace incum-
bent governments or gain local self-determination. A direct 
1 Given the particular methodology of the project 
(i.e. requiring the selected groups to participate ac-
tively in the research process), additional selection 
criteria included access to the relevant actors, and 
their willingness to take part in the project.
2 These studies were published as part of the Ber-
ghof Series on Resistance/Liberation Movements in 
Transition (see www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/
en/publications/transitions-series).
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or hinted reference to their political goals and/or ideologi-
cal agenda can be found in the names they choose: the 
Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-M) and its 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Free Aceh Movement 
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM), “We Ourselves” (Sinn 
Féin) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Kosovo Liber-
ation Army (KLA), Farabundo Martí Liberation Front 
(Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, 
FMLN), 19th of April Movement (M19),3 and the African 
National Congress (ANC).
These movements describe and justify the recourse to viol-
ent political activism as a legitimate form of self-defence in 
the face of acute human rights abuses and denial of 
democracy. They appeal to international norms such as the 
right to self-determination4 or the right to fundamental 
freedoms5 to support their “right to revolt” (Maharaj 2008, 
12). For instance, official Sinn Féin declarations (e.g. the 
1994 Peace Proposal) define armed struggle as “a legitimate 
part of a people’s resistance to foreign oppression” (De 
Brún 2008, 25). Some movements deliberately emphasised 
the self-limited nature of their armed activities against 
“legitimate targets” to garner support both internally and 
internationally. The ANC even committed itself in 1980 to 
observe the Geneva Protocol relating to irregular warfare, 
while the KLA issued an internal directive instructing its 
members to “commit liberation acts with a just character, 
and not attack socio-cultural monuments, civilian popu-
lation and subjects of importance for the life of the people” 
(cited in Bekaj 2010, 16). Internally, these movements also 
claim that their armed activities were supported by large 
segments of society (i.e. within their ethnic or social con-
stituency), who consider them to be legitimate defenders of 
their interests and grievances. Most case study authors 
highlight the repression-mobilisation cycle whereby state 
counter-insurgency operations, by cracking down on un-
armed civil society activists, led to an increased level of 
popular support for the armed insurgency.
Armed struggle is described as a means of last resort, em-
ployed after all other forms of political action have been 
met with severe state repression. In South Africa, the ANC 
initially used solely nonviolent means of struggle, only es-
tablishing its armed wing Umkonto we Siswe (MK) in 1961 
following the 1960 Sharpeville massacre and the enforce-
ment of a ban that prevented it from operating peacefully. 
Maharaj (2008, 12) recalls Mandela’s justification of armed 
struggle as a “legitimate form of self-defence against a 
morally repugnant system of government which will not 
allow even peaceful forms of protest”. He goes on to argue 
that “violence would begin whether we initiated it or not. If 
we did not take the lead now, we would soon be latecomers 
and followers in a movement we did not control” (Maharaj 
2008, 10). Likewise, the CPN-M in Nepal first entered par-
liamentary politics, only preparing for a “protracted 
people’s war” in 1995 after encountering police repression, 
“fake trials”, and mass arrests (Ogura 2008). The study on 
the M19 draws a similar picture of the movement’s emerg-
ence in the aftermath of rigged elections, and also notes its 
members’ conviction that their struggle would only be re-
spected by the oligarchy if backed by the power of arms. In 
Aceh, the decision by the founders of the GAM to resort to 
“reactive rebellion” is described as “the only language that 
Jakarta understood”, and as a defensive posture “to 
counterbalance the language of the enemy” (Aguswandi 
and Zunzer 2008, 6) after the government retaliated viol-
ently and brutally to their declaration of independence. In 
Northern Ireland, the violent repression of the civil rights 
movement in the 1960s and the introduction of intern-
ment without trial in 1971 convinced Sinn Féin members 
that only armed struggle could accomplish the end of Brit-
ish rule in Ireland. In El Salvador, “a great part of … so-
3 The M19 was named after the date of a rigged 
general election on 19 April 1970 which created part 
of the impetus for establishing the movement – 
thereby offering a clear indication of its pro-democ-
racy agenda.
4 “All peoples have the right to self-deter-
mination.” United Nations International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Part 1, Ar-
ticle 1.1. According to the Geneva Conventions 
(Protocol 1, Part 1 Article 1.4), such a right applies 
to cases of colonial domination, alien military occu-
pation, and where a distinct racial group is denied 
equal access to government (so-called “racist re-
gimes”).
5 “It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to 
have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against 
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should 
be protected by the rule of law. … Member States 
have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation 
with the United Nations, the promotion of universal 
respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.” Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Preamble.
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ciety viewed armed struggle as the only possible way to face 
structural violence”, amidst the “lack of institutional chan-
nels that would resolve the political, economic and social 
crisis” prevailing in the 1970s (Álvarez 2010, 8). Finally, in 
Kosovo, the KLA emerged after several years of mass-based 
nonviolent struggle against Serb domination over the Al-
banian majority, which was crushed by the regime and 
largely ignored by the international community. The side-
lining of the Kosovo delegation at the 1992 London Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia and during the Dayton negoti-
ations merely reinforced the belief among the Albanian 
population that only warfare could attract international at-
tention to their plight (Bekaj 2010, 22).
1.2. Transitions Between Violent and Non-Violent Politics
Although the shift from conventional political action or 
peaceful resistance to armed insurgency is described by re-
sistance or liberation movements as an option of last re-
sort, these actors strongly object to the typical depiction in 
the policy world and scholarly literature of linear and 
unidirectional transitions “from rebellion to politics” (Sö-
derberg Kovacs 2007). They contend instead that armed re-
bellion represents one form of political action – rather 
than its opposite. One study notes that “there was …politi-
cal armed struggle and there was political non-armed 
struggle” (De Brún 2008, 6), while another quotes von 
Clausewitz’s definition of war as “a continuation of politics 
[by other means]” (Maharaj 2008, 11).
As we have seen, the groups profiled in this paper had 
clearly articulated political visions right from their incep-
tion, leading at various times to different political strategies 
being employed consecutively or simultaneously. In Ire-
land, the Republican movement has passed through vari-
ous phases of political struggle over the course of more 
than eight hundred years, which have included “passive re-
sistance, agrarian unrest, armed uprising, mass movements 
and political agitation, language and cultural struggles, 
constitutional and parliamentary engagement” (De Brún 
2008, 6). Armed activity came to the fore whenever politi-
cal engagement broke down. Moreover, once militants 
started resorting to armed activities, it did not mean that 
they ceased their engagement on the other fronts. For 
example, from 1961 to 1990 the ANC defined armed ac-
tivities as one of four “pillars of struggle”, alongside non-
violent mass mobilisation, the political underground 
movement, and the international campaign to isolate the 
apartheid regime. “The development and combination of 
these four pillars were seen as the basis for realising the 
aims of the struggle” (Maharaj 2008, 13). In El Salvador, 
the FMLN also “emphasised the combination of armed 
struggle with the political struggle of the masses” through-
out the 1980s, and increasingly pursued a strategy of ne-
gotiations and conventional political action alongside its 
military campaigns (Álvarez 2010, 20). “Diplomatic war-
fare” was also part of its agenda, and one of its six fronts 
was specifically dedicated to international advocacy. In the 
Aceh separatist struggle, the exiled political leadership was 
in charge of conducting peaceful international advocacy to 
complement their field troops’ guerrilla warfare. During 
armed campaigns by the IRA in Northern Ireland in the 
1970s and 1980s, activists also pursued nonviolent resis-
tance (e.g. hunger strikes or “blanket” protests in prison to 
demand recognition of their status as political prisoners) 
and electoral activities (i.e. the “armalite and ballot box” 
strategy). This dual strategy was aimed at “winning the 
hearts and minds” of the wider nationalist community 
while putting pressure on the British government to open 
up negotiations (De Brún 2008).
This paper homes in on the shifts from mixed armed/un-
armed political strategies during periods of active conflict 
and peace process, to the progressive demobilisation of 
their military structures and the adoption of exclusively 
unarmed means of political engagement. Although intra-
state armed conflicts end in various different manners, the 
majority of conflicts since the end of the Cold War have 
been settled through a negotiated transition,6 and armed 
groups have thus become central stakeholders in peace 
processes and post-war peacebuilding. In asymmetric con-
6 According to the Human Security Brief 2007, 
fifty-eight armed conflicts were terminated through 
a negotiated settlement in the period between 
1990–2005, as against twenty-eight conflicts which 
ended with the military victory of one party 
(Human Security Center 2008, 35).
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flicts between state and non-state parties, peace and stabil-
ity are closely intertwined with demands for justice, human 
rights, or democracy, which are not produced auto-
matically by the signing of an inter-party agreement. In 
fact, statistical surveys reveal that more than one third of 
conflicts settled through peace agreements since 1989 have 
seen a return to violence within five years (Human Security 
Center 2008). Therefore, one should envisage conflict 
transformation as an extended process stretching far 
beyond the restricted timeline of peace negotiations as 
such: it encompasses early de-escalation measures (e.g. 
talks about talks and pre-negotiations), peace processes 
(official and unofficial inter-party talks, humanitarian ac-
cords, and more comprehensive peace agreements), and 
the implementation of the parties’ respective commitments 
through post-war demobilisation and disarmament, peace-
building, and democratic consolidation. The remainder of 
this paper focuses on the dynamics at play during these ex-
tended phases of behavioural de-radicalisation, collective 
demobilisation, and peaceful transformation.
2. Organisational Structure and Dynamics
We now turn to the factors influencing non-state armed 
groups’ shifts from violent insurgency to the negotiating 
table, with a particular focus on the intra-party level of 
analysis. The existing literature on the deradicalisation of 
armed groups through peace processes and inter-party ne-
gotiations can be classified into two main categories. A first 
type of study concentrates on (national or international) 
environmental factors which condition the behaviour of 
rebel groups, such as the “political opportunity structure” 
analysed by social movement theory (e.g. Tarrow 1998), 
state counter-terrorism policies emphasised by security ex-
perts (e.g. Jones and Libicki 2008), or transnational geo-
political dynamics (such as the loss of external “patrons” 
after the end of the Cold War) favoured by international 
relations specialists. For their part, conflict resolution 
scholars highlight inter-party (relational) factors through 
the concepts of “ripeness” and “mutually-hurting stale-
mates” (Zartman 1996), which focus on the subjective and 
objective balance of power between the state and its armed 
challengers. Although these approaches offer valid el-
ements of explanation for de-radicalisation processes, they 
fail to account for internal (individual or organisational) 
factors of transition. The few analyses that specifically deal 
with intra-party dynamics tend to focus primarily on idio-
syncratic factors of individual disengagement, such as age, 
maturation, and/or changes in life course, discovery of al-
ternative belief systems, deconstruction of enemy images, 
etc. (Bjorgo and Horgan 2009). By contrast, we now turn to 
organisational factors accounting for collective shifts to-
wards negotiations by the movement as a whole, such as 
decision-making structure and leadership styles (2.1), and 
horizontal/vertical relations and communication channels 
between members (2.2).
2.1. Leadership and Decision-making
Many insurgency movements are organised around distinct 
dual structures which simultaneously allow armed and un-
armed forms of struggle. In some instances, political move-
ments predate the formation of a military branch, and 
both are kept largely autonomous in order to allow the 
political front to conduct non-violent campaigns, pursue 
electoral politics, or conduct negotiations. This was the 
case with the ANC and its armed wing MK in South Africa, 
the GAM government in exile and AGAM field com-
manders in Aceh, Sinn Féin and the IRA in Northern Ire-
land, and to some extent the CPN-M and the PLA in 
Nepal. For their part, Latin American guerrillas such as the 
M19 and FMLN defined themselves as “political-military 
organisations” with a combined command structure. Here, 
peaceful political action was subordinated to military 
priorities (Álvarez 2010, 20), and in fact, it was the military 
leadership that took all political decisions and led the ne-
gotiation teams. In Kosovo as well, the KLA was initially es-
tablished as a military organisation, which in turn created a 
political directorate (led by Hashim Thaci who is now 
prime minister) that was in charge of representing the 
movement during negotiations, but which was subordinate 
to the military leadership.
Although these organisational variations have important 
implications for the pace and effectiveness of a movement’s 
turn to mainstream political action after peace agreements 
(as will be seen in section 3), their influence on strategic 
shifts from insurgency to dialogue with state agents is more 
uncertain, as the case studies show that the decision to ne-
gotiate a peaceful transition might be made by political as 
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well as military leaders. The role of the movement’s leader-
ship is stressed in all studies, emphasising their proactive 
sense of initiative and their ability to assess shifting power 
relationships and react swiftly to arising windows of op-
portunity, sometimes without any prior consultation with-
in the movement. This was the case, for instance, when 
imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela took the unilat-
eral decision in 1989 to write a letter to President Botha, in 
which he set out the principle of majority rule while ad-
dressing the fears and concerns of the white minority. Al-
though this bold step was met with heavy scepticism inside 
his own party, it played a key pre-emptive role for future 
negotiations by securing a central role for the ANC in the 
peace process. The M19 study also highlights the quasi-
religious nature of hierarchical structures – “the com-
mander is never wrong” (García Durán et al. 2008, 27) – 
and the decisive role played by the movement’s successive 
leaders. For instance, Commander Pizarro showed his abil-
ity to convert from a military to a political leader when he 
initiated a peace process with the Colombian government 
in 1989. His audacious offer of disarmament was made 
without any prior consultation within his own movement 
or with other guerrillas, but was later internally approved 
by a democratic vote in favour of ending the armed re-
bellion.
Political scientists identify three broad categories of 
leaders: ideologues have a predetermined agenda which 
conditions all their decisions and their relations with their 
constituencies; strategists also have a set goal but adapt the 
means of pursuing it according to the context (political 
timing) and what constituents will support; pragmatists 
adapt their goals and agenda to the expectations of con-
stituents and the situation (Hermann and Gerard 2009). 
Although rebel leaders are often perceived as stubborn and 
intransigent ideologues, all “insider experts” consulted for 
this research stressed the rationality of the decision-making 
process, in which strategic or pragmatic leaders constantly 
reassess the ends and means of insurgency in the light of an 
evolving environment.
In line with the strategic style of leadership described 
above, the studies reveal the adoption of violent means to 
be an instrumental rather than an ideological choice, and 
describe the decision to enter a peace process as proceeding 
from a rational calculation of the possibilities and limi-
tations inherent in non-violent politics as opposed to con-
tinuing the armed conflict. In Colombia, the M19 
leadership realised during the 1980s that war had become 
an obstacle to change, as the oligarchy was seeking to ex-
ploit violence for the perpetuation of the status quo. In 
search of alternatives, they reformulated their strategy of 
“weapons at the service of politics” to “peace at the service 
of politics”, and from “change for peace” to “peace for 
change”. In other words, they appropriated the notion of 
peace as a transformative strategy of action in itself, rather 
than a distant absolute end (García Durán et al. 2008). In 
South Africa, the ANC also took a proactive decision 
around 1990 to embrace negotiations as “a new terrain of 
struggle” and “primary site of contestation” (Maharaj 
2008, 23), and unilaterally suspended its armed struggle in 
order to force the regime into formal peace talks. The 
CPN-M study also presents the movement’s shift from 
armed activities to peaceful street protest and negotiations 
in 2006 as an illustration of the motto “firm with prin-
ciples and flexible with tactics” (Ogura 2008, 45).
The pragmatist style of leadership described above is also 
consistent with the readiness of some rebel leaders to reas-
sess the original objectives and discursive frame of their 
struggle. In Colombia, El Salvador, and Nepal, a redefini-
tion of the insurgents’ primary goals was a clear precon-
dition for their strategic shift from armed rebellion to 
negotiation. Around 1979, the M19 leaders shifted their 
main political objective from socialism to democracy. The 
FMLN underwent a similar reorientation when it gave up 
its revolutionary aspirations to advocate for reform within 
the framework of representative democracy and market 
economy; from then on, its agenda primarily focused on 
transparent elections, an independent judiciary, and de-
militarisation. In Nepal, the Maoists also underwent a 
major ideological shift around 2001 from seeking a com-
munist one-party system to embracing competitive multi-
party democracy, and reoriented their programme towards 
introducing a new constitution, electing a constituent as-
sembly, and establishing a republic. This move enabled 
them to join forces with their former enemies, the legal op-
position parties, against the autocratic regime of King 
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Gyanendra. When it comes to secessionist movements, the 
elements of flexibility mainly revolve around the definition 
and content of self-determination. For instance, GAM’s 
decision, voiced in the 2002 Stavanger Declaration, to give 
up its claim to an independent Islamic state of Aceh and 
settle for self-government in a decentralised democratic 
system, resulted from a pragmatic decision that the mean-
ing of independence was more important than the term 
itself.
2.2. Horizontal and Vertical Communication Channels
Effective social or political movements require decisive and 
visionary leaders, but also strong and cohesive organi-
sations. Internal consultation and power dynamics within 
rebel movements, either horizontally (e.g. between “mod-
erates” and “radicals”) or vertically (across the hierarchy), 
play important roles in influencing the move from militan-
cy to negotiated politics. There are claims in the literature 
on counter-insurgency and negotiation that armed groups 
are most effectively brought to the negotiation table by 
weakening them through provoking defection, implosion, 
and infighting between members (e.g. Alterman 1999; Cro-
nin 2010). By contrast, other studies highlight the import-
ance of intra-group cohesion to ensure a successful peace 
process and post-war political viability of these movements 
(Söderberg Kovacs 2007; Al-Ashimi and Goerzig 2010; Du-
douet 2010).
 The case studies examined here, unsurprisingly, strongly 
support the latter argument. Internal consultation and de-
bate preceding, accompanying, or following back-channel 
and formal negotiations are cited as critical factors that en-
sure a high degree of accountability and unity among 
members and supporters, thus enabling collective owner-
ship of transformation processes from violent insurgency 
to peaceful transition, and in turn guaranteeing sustainable 
conflict settlements. The Maoists in Nepal, for instance, 
convened several thousand members in inclusive con-
ferences at critical moments in the conflict and the peace 
process, in order to ensure that decisions would be taken 
on behalf of the whole movement. In several studies, jails 
are also described as a space for encounter and debate, 
where political options are weighed and discussed at 
length, away from the constant preoccupations and danger 
which might distract underground leaders at large from 
engaging in strategic assessments of the situation (e.g. Gar-
cía Durán et al. 2008).
Maintaining internal cohesion is particularly crucial during 
volatile war-to-peace transitions, as peace processes are 
held to be particularly vulnerable to “spoiler violence” by 
splinter groups seeking to derail or prevent peace agree-
ments (e.g. Darby and McGinty 2000). This was par-
ticularly the case in Northern Ireland and South Africa, 
where peace negotiations took place amidst an upsurge in 
violence generated by former allies or components of the 
insurgency movement who were opposed to a peace deal or 
protesting against their alleged marginalisation. In this 
context, the leadership stood out for their ability to sustain 
their group’s commitment to the negotiation process, and 
keep the majority of their movement united behind a com-
mon position.
Intra-group power struggles are very sensitive issues for in-
surgency movements, and since most of the case studies 
were written by, or together with, (former) members, they 
hardly mention internal disagreements and dispute resol-
ution mechanisms – with the exception of two studies 
written by outside analysts on the basis of extensive inter-
views with (former) leaders. The study on the FMLN ad-
dresses the numerous disagreements which arose between 
its five guerrilla fronts over the goals of the revolution and 
the best strategy for reaching them (i.e. armed struggle 
until victory or parallel armed struggle and negotiation). 
The main conflict was ultimately “resolved” after the sui-
cide of the leader from the most radical guerrilla group. 
The case study on the Nepali Maoists also mentions the oc-
currence of intra-party confrontation in 2004 over ques-
tions of internal democracy and the definition of the 
movement’s primary target enemy (i.e. India or the mon-
archy). Internal unity was restored after the king’s coup 
d’état in early 2005 helped to resolve the dispute over stra-
tegic priorities.
Vertical communication through the movement’s hierarchy 
is also important in order to gather support for new strat-
egies and prepare members or supporters for the changes 
ahead. In the case of the CPN-M, the lines of communi-
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cation were primarily top-down, in the form of political 
training for Maoist cadres to explain the strategic shifts 
made during the peace process. The fact that since the sig-
ning of the 2006 peace accord most Maoist combatants 
have remained stationed in cantonments, patiently waiting 
for a political compromise on their army integration and/
or socio-economic rehabilitation, can largely be explained 
by the high level of discipline and ideology within the 
movement, as well as the intensive “coaching” carried out 
down the chain of command by cadres and commanders 
(Ogura 2008). In Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin also engaged 
in intense negotiation with the Republican activist base 
which was “kept abreast of developments as they unfolded 
and as much as possible knew about developments before 
they heard about them in the media” (De Brún 2008, 15). 
In South Africa, observers describe the peace negotiations 
as a “pact” between ANC elites and the elites of the out-
going order, which had the effect of alienating other armed 
formations (such as the Inkatha Freedom Party) that were 
excluded from it. However, this theory ignores the sub-
stantive role played by the ANC’s campaign of rolling mass 
action and the fact that the ANC regularly reported back to 
its constituency in mass rallies (Maharaj 2008).
3. Post-War Adaptation
Having shown that strong leadership and cohesive organi-
sations are crucial factors enabling armed groups to come 
to the negotiation table with the state, we now turn to 
examine the impact of peaceful transitions on their organi-
sational structures. Focusing on the timing and challenges 
of transforming armed groups into conventional political 
entities in the aftermath of negotiated peace agreements, 
we question the usefulness of early demobilisation and dis-
armament (3.1.), spell out transitional mechanisms to pre-
serve internal discipline and cohesion during fragile 
post-war transitions (3.2.), and highlight some factors fa-
cilitating an effective transformation of militant structures 
into democratic political parties (3.3.).
3.1. Challenges of Early Demobilisation
The clearest indication of armed groups’ political will to 
undergo post-war transitions from armed to conventional 
political activities consists in their participation in so-
called demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration 
(DDR) programmes, which are usually set up with inter-
national assistance immediately after a peace accord. Such 
schemes build on the assumption that rebel structures 
should be dismantled, and their members disarmed, as 
quickly as possible after the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, 
international DDR programmes (such as the UN DDR 
Standards) typically recommend “breaking down the com-
mand and control structures operating over rebel fighters 
… thus making it more difficult for them to return to or-
ganized rebellion” (Spear 2002, 141), thus reflecting a per-
ception of former combatants as spoilers and a “security 
threat”.
However, according to armed group veterans and analysts 
alike, such a view is highly problematic. Firstly, it fails to 
take into account the “security dilemma” encountered by 
(former) combatants, who regard the possession and use of 
arms as an indispensable prerequisite for the security of the 
people they represent. As a result, they will hesitate to 
abandon their militarised status before they are convinced 
that their political status and legitimacy is fully recognised 
by the government, that their wartime grievances will be 
addressed through comprehensive reforms, and that a 
backlash of force against them or the people for whom they 
stand can be ruled out (Dudouet et al. 2012). In fact, in 
most cases under scrutiny, decommissioning only took 
place at the end of a long post-war transition, following – 
or in parallel with – the implementation of structural re-
forms to address the root causes of violence through de-
mocratisation (South Africa, Colombia), demilitarisation 
and security sector reform (Northern Ireland, El Salvador, 
Nepal, Kosovo), or power devolution (Aceh).
Moreover, abrupt demobilisation entails the risk of creat-
ing a security vacuum, as it can lead to disorder and dis-
orientation among former combatants, trigger a return to 
violence by disaffected splinter groups, and make the re-
integration process more difficult – for instance by hinder-
ing the dissemination of information on reintegration 
options. Finally, DDR mechanisms tend to rely on a dis-
torted understanding of armed groups as purely military 
organisations, thereby overlooking the fact that many 
movements have a long history of non-military political 
struggle and structures, as reviewed above.
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By contrast, the case studies highlight the importance of 
retaining coordination and communication channels 
through out post-war transitions, which can be described as 
a two-stage process: short-term maintenance of command 
structures in order to supervise an orderly (re-)conversion 
process; and long-term institutionalisation of civilian en-
tities that pursue the struggle through conventional politi-
cal means.
3.2. Transitional Maintenance of Command Structures
The concept of “interim stabilisation measures” has re-
cently appeared in the DDR literature to encompass tem-
porary schemes designed to prevent the occurrence of 
security vacuums in the early stages of post-war transition, 
keep combatant cohesiveness intact within a military or ci-
vilian structure, and improve real and perceived security 
during the negotiation or planning of long-term con-
ventional security promotion activities (Colletta and Mug-
gah 2009). They offer not only combatants an opportunity 
to use their wartime skills and experience for peacekeeping 
purposes during volatile war-to-peace transitions, but are 
also useful confidence-building and social cohesion ex-
ercises that help prepare members for the socio-psycho-
logical transformation of switching their identity from 
combatant to civilian.
 In Northern Ireland, IRA command structures (i.e. the 
Army Council) have remained more or less intact since the 
1994 ceasefire, even after the leadership declared a formal 
end to its armed campaign in 2005. Even their political op-
ponents accepted the pragmatic logic that maintaining a 
leadership structure was necessary to oversee the transition 
and demobilisation of the organisation and prevent frus-
trated individuals from joining dissenting factions (McEvoy 
2012). In Aceh, in the wake of the 2005 peace accord, 
GAM’s military wing was transformed into a civilian Tran-
sitional Committee (KPA) to supervise the demobilisation 
of its combatants and maintain a cohesive structure until a 
political party could be formed. Establishing the KPA cre-
ated strong suspicions among the government represen-
tatives, who saw this structure as a continuation of the 
military wing of GAM under a new name and identity. 
From GAM’s perspective, however, the existence of a tran-
sitional body is perceived as a crucial means for the move-
ment to assist the transition process internally (Aguswandi 
and Zunzer 2008). Such structures also play a symbolic role 
by providing elements of continuity of struggle in the eyes 
of the movement’s constituency. In Kosovo, where a quick 
post-war dismantling of the victorious liberation move-
ment was bound to stir up opposition and alienate the local 
population, the KLA chief of staff insisted on the removal 
of the word “dissolution” from the negotiation agenda; in-
stead, the guerrilla force was transformed into a civilian se-
curity entity, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Aside 
from providing security (which was mainly taken over by 
international peacekeepers), it also played a crucial sym-
bolic role. Indeed, establishing the KPC met the aspirations 
of former combatants to “keep their uniforms on”, albeit 
within an unarmed civil organisation with specific emerg-
ency response and civil protection duties, while the political 
leadership was negotiating the establishment of a new se-
curity apparatus for post-independence Kosovo. Once the 
new Kosovo Security Force was set up in 2008, the KPC was 
dismantled in an orderly fashion (Bekaj 2010).
3.3. Challenges of Political Institutionalisation
While interim stabilisation measures are essential to pro-
vide security in volatile environments and facilitate post-
war re-skilling for combatants, the formation of cohesive 
and effective post-war political structures represents a 
major challenge for armed opposition movements which 
aspire to participate in post-war statebuilding and demo-
cratic transitions, especially after decades of illegal exist-
ence, exile, or underground operations (Soderberg Kovacs 
2007).
Most of the movements under scrutiny have achieved re-
markable long-term or recent success in their post-war 
conversion “from bullets to ballots”, from the outstanding 
performance of the ANC in South Africa, which gained 63 
percent of the votes in 1994 and has been confirmed in 
power in all subsequent elections, to the election of the 
FMLN presidential candidate in 2009 in El Salvador. In 
fact, with the exception of the M19 in Colombia, all nine 
movements examined in this paper are presently either in 
control of the national or autonomous (regional) legis-
lative or executive powers, or are participating in power-
sharing governments.
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The growing body of literature on the post-war political 
development of insurgency movements identifies a 
number of factors which might explain the success or fail-
ure of their transitions from the battleground to the elec-
toral arena. It is argued for instance that movements which 
had a pre-war history as a political party or retained a civil-
ian command structure and a political branch throughout 
the conflict can more easily build on this experience in the 
post-war environment (De Zeeuw 2008, 13).
In fact, the only movements found in the case studies to 
possess a combined political-military command structure 
faced difficulties in establishing a cohesive party in the 
wake of the peace process. Despite its successful transition 
into a major opposition party which went on to win the 
presidential election in 2009, the FMLN was affected by 
multiple individual defections and collective splits 
throughout the 1990s (e.g. by two of its five former con-
stituent guerrilla groups). The KLA did not form its own 
party, and instead its members went on to establish their 
own formations, competing for power in the newly-
independent state of Kosovo; one of these parties is cur-
rently in power. The demobilisation of the M19 guerrilla 
forces was accompanied by the formation of a coalition 
party with other leftist activists, Democratic Alliance-M19. 
But despite this new party’s early achievements in the im-
mediate post-agreement phase (constituent assembly, 
national and local elections in 1990–91), it steadily lost its 
initial electoral support and has remained a minor political 
force ever since. This failure can be partly explained by the 
loss of internal cohesion and political dispersion entailed 
by the demobilisation process, the new party’s inability to 
consolidate its social base, and its lack of experience in the 
electoral process and institutional arena (García Durán et 
al. 2008). At other levels, however, this political force has 
played an important role in running social projects, de-
partmental and municipal bureaus, women’s groups, and 
work with victims.
Even movements with a long history of political en-
gagement and cohesive civilian structures are not immune 
to intra-party tensions or rivalries over leadership or pro-
gramme issues in the aftermath of peace agreements. In 
Nepal, internal dissension over ideological and strategic 
decisions on the path and pace of peace implementation 
processes particularly increased after the formation of a 
Maoist-led government in 2008, as those confronted with 
the realities of power (in particular Prime Minister Prach-
anda) emphasised a pragmatic stance and discourse while 
the party ideologues and radicals remain focused on safe-
guarding their Maoist values and struggle for socialist 
democracy. In Northern Ireland as well, Sinn Féin’s adop-
tion of a strategy of dialogue, and later its decision to join a 
power-sharing government with former political oppo-
nents, led to the formation of dissident Republican groups 
who have attempted to derail the course of the peacebuild-
ing process. But De Brún argues that although they still 
exist, “they have no support, no political organisation, and 
have articulated no alternative to the strategy to which the 
overwhelming majority of Republican activists and former 
prisoners subscribe” (2008, 16).
Another factor of internal tension is the return of exiled or 
imprisoned leadership, creating possible misunder-
standings or rivalries with internal underground leaders. 
This was most obviously the case in Aceh, where the exiled 
government’s return home after the 2005 peace agreement 
led to a temporary split of the GAM movement into two 
camps (the Swedish group versus the KPA and field com-
manders), who presented separate candidates for the prov-
incial elections. In South Africa too, political tensions 
between the ANC’s former internal, external, and prison 
forces (the “Robben Islanders”) still have repercussions 
today, and the challenges of consolidating a cohesive post-
war movement were demonstrated for instance by the 2008 
leadership crisis and formation of a breakaway party.
Beyond the challenges of maintaining internal cohesion, 
the transition from armed resistance to conventional 
politics also requires adopting a new political culture, for-
mulating a new programme, installing party organisational 
structures, recruiting party cadres, and building their ca-
pacity to govern. The Nepali study mentions the CPN-M’s 
organisational shift ahead of the April 2008 constituent as-
sembly elections “from a war-time to a peace-time system” 
(Ogura 2008, 41), restructuring its civilian apparatus to 
conform with the state administrative divisions and train-
ing cadres for political action and “peaceful revolutionary 
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change”. In Aceh, GAM was able to expand and strengthen 
its political wing during the peace process, and also estab-
lished parallel state structures at all levels of adminis-
tration. Its biggest challenge, having won the 2006 
provincial elections as well as many district-level elections, 
is to prove that it can run Aceh province better than the 
Jakarta government did (Aguswandi and Zunzer 2008).
 Success in the electoral arena is also conditioned by the 
ability of the new political formations to broaden their sup-
port base beyond their initial constituency, and to recruit 
new party cadres who were not involved in the armed 
struggle. For instance, the ANC has been quite successful in 
pursuing a very inclusive programme which cuts across 
racial and ideological party lines. For its part, Sinn Féin has 
now become the largest party representing the nationalist 
community in Northern Ireland (a position previously held 
by the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party), but 
it remains a community-based party focused on the de-
mands of one side of the electorate, and does not really seek 
to rally support across the sectarian divide. In El Salvador, 
the FMLN has managed to integrate new civilian members 
(including the incumbent President Funes), but the vast 
majority of party leaders are former guerrilla commanders. 
This points to the importance of adapting wartime leader-
ship structures to new priorities and agendas, seeking a 
healthy balance between continuity or stability and trans-
formation in order to avoid the phenomenon of “fossil-
isation” where entrenched party leaders continue to lead 
the movement in quasi-authoritarian style (see section 1).
These challenges to post-war institutionalisation thus high-
light the need for locally-tailored external capacity-build-
ing support in democratic party politics by international 
agencies (such as political foundations or NGOs with elec-
toral expertise), through technical or financial assistance in 
organisational development, (legal) financing, parliamen-
tary tasks, election campaigning, administrative skills, or 
good governance.
4. Conclusion
Our examination of the influence of the discourse and self-
analysis of (former) members of armed opposition move-
ments on the internal factors shaping the adoption and 
adaptation of goals and strategies during the processes of 
conflict escalation and de-escalation highlights the rational 
decision-making process whereby strategic and pragmatist 
military/political leaders constantly (re-)assess and adjust 
their methods of action (from unarmed to armed tactics 
and vice versa) according to the evolving strategic environ-
ment. The vertical and horizontal relations and communi-
cation between members (as well as their constituencies) 
are found to be critical factors enabling collective owner-
ship of conflict transformation processes and preventing 
the occurrence of intra-party splits and disaffection during 
peace negotiations. Finally, the claim that rebel organi-
sations should be broken down as quickly as possible dur-
ing peace processes is found to be dubious; the findings 
highlight instead the importance of (at least temporarily) 
retaining coordination and communication channels 
through cohesive structures, in parallel with the devel-
opment and/or consolidation of civilian entities that pur-
sue the “struggle” non-violently through democratic 
politics.
All of these issues would merit further analysis though 
complementary methodologies offering a more indepen-
dent perspective on intra-group dynamics. In particular, 
the “subjective” findings gathered here call for more in-
depth research on the boundaries between different forms 
of political action (within a wide spectrum from con-
ventional party politics to nonviolent struggle, self-limited 
armed insurgency, and indiscriminate terror); on the inter-
nal dynamics and decision-making involved in shifting 
goals and strategies; and on their various implications for 
the processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. There 
also needs to be more interdisciplinary investigation on the 
linkages between internal cohesion, negotiations, political 
transitions, and post-war institutionalisation.
Finally, such analysis might offer useful lessons for con-
structive international engagement to support the con-
version of state challengers into active state- and 
peace-builders, as long as these actors are politically-
motivated movements which enjoy strong social legitimacy 
and aspire to take part in democratic politics. Indeed, our 
findings call for a rethinking of conventional intervention 
in intra-state political conflicts, promoting the cohesion 
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rather than dissolution of combatant structures during ne-
gotiations; engaging with the real leaders who have the 
power to implement a deal or bring their constituency with 
them (rather than “moderates” or “proxies”); and offering 
technical assistance to support political transitions into or-
ganisations that possess a future role within a peaceful en-
vironment, in contrast to criminalisation strategies (e.g. 
through anti-terrorist measures such as proscription and 
counter-insurgency) which prevent these groups from ex-
panding their political capacities.
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